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The State and the Origins of Informal Economic Activity: Insights from Kampala 
Abstract: Understanding the root causes of informal economic activity is crucial for 
the effective governance of the informal sphere. Precisely what these root causes are, 
however, is subject to significant debate. This article contributes to these debates by 
arguing that the state is central to the origin and evolution of informality. Stressing the 
importance of understanding informality through a historically rooted political 
economy approach, it analyzes the modern history of informal vending in Kampala, 
Uganda, and identifies six ways in which the state has fundamentally shaped informal 
economic activity in the city: colonial planning; a history of poor governance and 
instability; economic liberalization; geographic development trends; an ineffective 
taxation regime; and the self-interest of state officials. An appropriate understanding 
of the centrality of the state in the informal economy highlights the necessity of 
designing effective institutions, policies and interventions that prioritize the needs of 
the urban poor.  
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Informal economic activity is a global phenomenon. In cities across Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, the trade of otherwise legal goods and services outside of the regulatory and taxation 
structures of the state is subject to various forms of co-operation, co-option, repression and neglect 
by governments that view it as a nuisance, a source of marginal survivalist activities, an obstacle 
to development or a potential driver of economic growth. A more coherent and proactive approach 
to informal economic governance is needed, and this itself must be based on a full understanding 
of the how and why informal economies emerge and evolve over time.  
The underlying causes of informal economic activity have long been a subject of intense 
scholarly and policy debate. While some hold that informality is a by-product of 
underdevelopment that will be eradicated with economic growth, others contend that it is a form 
of market exploitation and still more claim that is the result of a rational response to ineffective 
economic governance and unpopular laws and regulations.1 This article contributes to these 
debates by arguing that the origin and evolution of informality can only be understood through a 
historically rooted political economy approach that places the state at the centre of analysis. 
Adopting such an approach in its exploration of informal vending in Kampala, Uganda, it 
highlights six ways in which the state has played a central role in creating, sustaining or otherwise 
shaping informality: through the history of colonial planning in the city; through Uganda’s post-
 
1 Each of these views is explored in the subsequent section of this paper.  
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independence history of poor governance and instability; through the country’s extensive 
economic liberalization; through internal geographic trends of development that have fuelled urban 
growth in Kampala; through the country’s tax system; and through the self-interest of state officials 
who gain political and/or economic benefits from the existence of the informal sphere. 
The analysis of the relationship between the state and the informal economy presented here 
is based on a combination of primary and secondary research methods. Over 130 informal vendors, 
formal sector business people, state officials and civil society officials were interviewed in 
Kampala in 2015 as part of a broad study of the politics of informal vending in the city. Extensive 
analysis of policy reports, newspaper articles and relevant constitutional and legislative documents 
was also undertaken to expand on crucial points identified during fieldwork and construct a 
complete account of the role of the state in the city’s informal sphere.  
The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. The first explores current 
literature on the causes of informal economic activity and details the primary features of dualist, 
structuralist and neoliberal accounts. The second then turns its attention to the Kampala, Uganda, 
to examine the fundamental role that the state has played in informal economic activity in the city. 
The significance of colonial planning, governance and instability, economic liberalization, the 
geography of development, taxation and the self-interest of state officials are all explored.  
Conclusions are offered in the final section, where the implications that this state-centric approach 
has for informal economic governance are discussed.  
 
Three Perspectives on the Causes of Informal Economic Activity 
 Common explanations of the causes of informal economic activity can be divided into three 
categories: dualist accounts that cast informality as a feature of underdevelopment; structuralist 
accounts that frame informality as a form of exploitation; and neoliberal accounts that view 
informality as the aggregate result of the rational choices of individual entrepreneurs.2  
 
Dualism 
Early approaches to informal economic activity view the informal sphere as largely 
unconnected to its formal counterpart and comprised of individuals undertaking marginal activities 
 
2 For various treatments of the literature on informal economic activity, see: Carr and Chen (2001); Chen (2012); 
Gërxhani (2004); Habib-Mintz (2009); Losby et al. (2002); Rakowski (1994); and Yusuff (2011). 
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as a form of livelihood support (Hart 1973; and ILO 1972). These are defined by the common 
view, inherent in early forms of Marxism, neoclassical economics and modernization theory, that 
capitalist development would necessarily lead to the dramatic transformation of pre-capitalist 
political economies and involve the widespread absorption of labour. From this perspective, the 
informal sphere exists as a result of inadequate demand for the high supply of labour that 
underdevelopment entails; the growth of the formal sector, it was assumed, would increase 
opportunities for formal employment, thereby reducing the disconnect between the supply of and 
demand for labour that resulted in excess capacity.3  
 
Structuralism 
Structuralist accounts view the informal sphere as inherently subordinate to its formal 
counterpart (Moser 1978; Portes et al. eds. 1989; and Portes and Schauffler 1993). For 
structuralists, the formal and informal spheres are connected through a wide range of complex 
mechanisms and relationships in a way that allows the former to function through the exploitation 
of the latter. According to this understanding, informality plays a key role in the capitalist system 
by supplying low-cost goods and services for formal firms, facilitating the maximization of profits  
through the minimization of expenditures on labour, production and distribution. Formal workers 
also benefit from the existence of the informal sphere as it allows them to survive on otherwise 
inadequate wages, while wealthier participants in the informal economy are able to sustain or 
improve their socioeconomic position by taking advantage of less expensive goods and services. 
From this perspective, informality is therefore produced and sustained through the division of 
labour and forms of production, distribution and accumulation that define capitalism and exist both 




Neoliberal interpretations of informality instead view informal economic activity as the 
result of rational economic behaviour. The work of Hernando de Soto (1989) is particularly 
important here. In his analysis of informal economic activity in Peru, de Soto portrays the informal 
 
3 Habib-Mintz (2009). For the similarities between Marxist and more orthodox approaches to the role of the informal 
sphere in the political economy of development, see Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987). 
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sphere as a site of market creativity and dynamism that is populated by a diverse array of small-
scale entrepreneurs. In doing so, he employs the emphasis that neoclassical economic analysis 
places on rational actors to argue that informal actors weigh the respective costs and benefits that 
informality and formality each entail, and choose the former, despite its undesirability, due to the 
burdens that governments place on the latter. For de Soto, therefore, engaging in informal 
economic activity is a form of contesting the state, with the conscious evasion of official legal and 
regulatory structures serving as a popular challenge to the state’s poorly managed economic 
dominance. 
De Soto does not, however, view informal economic activity as entirely beneficial. Instead, 
he argues, it can have a variety of negative effects: reduced levels of productivity and investment, 
higher prices for services, minimal technological development and difficulties collecting tax 
revenues and constructing macroeconomic policy. De Soto therefore argues that the state must act 
to formalize the informal sphere, and asserts that it is best able to do so by reducing the costs of 
formality and reforming the legal system to provide protections for property rights, contracts and 
extracontractual liabilities. De Soto’s work is tied to the broader idea that underdevelopment is 
caused by overly restrictive, burdensome or distortionary state policies and can be ‘solved’ through 
market reforms. The idea that markets are a solution to rather than a cause of informality has 
inspired a vast amount of literature advocating lower taxes, fewer regulations and less bureaucracy 
as the best means of reducing the costs of entering the formal sphere and harnessing the 
developmental potential of informal entrepreneurs, with the neoliberal interpretation of informality 
coming to dominate mainstream scholarship (Albrecht et al. 2009; Bromley 1990; Djankov et al. 
2010; Ihrig and Moe 2004; Loayza 1996; Maloney 2004; Schneider and Enste 2000; and Sparks 
and Barnett 2010), major international institutions, most notably the World Bank (Perry et al. 2007 
and popular accounts (Neuwirth 2011). De Soto’s work therefore not only provides an important 
understanding of how informal actors contest the state, but also informs orthodox approaches to 
how the state should, in turn, act to reduce informality. It remains a central reference point for all 
contemporary analysis of informal economic activity.  
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The State and the Roots of Informality in Kampala 
Dualist, structuralist and neoliberal interpretations dominate standard explanations of the 
origins and evolution of informal economic activity. What each lacks, however, is a 
comprehensive account of the centrality of the state. 
The state plays a crucial role in producing and perpetuating informal economic activity 
both in Kampala and in Uganda more generally. Six ways in which it has done and continues to 
do so are explored here: through colonial planning; through a history of poor governance and 
instability; through economic liberalization; through geographic development trends; through tax 
policy; and through the self-interest of state officials.  
 
Colonial Planning 
Kampala’s physical and economic landscape has been profoundly influenced by its 
colonial heritage. Kampala first became a township under the British colonial administration in 
1902, and with gradual expansion, came to cover what are now the areas of Nakasero, Kololo and 
Old Kampala in Kampala Central Division by the late colonial period. Colonial Kampala was 
adjacent to, but administratively separate from, the indigenous city of Mengo to the immediate 
south and west, which served as the capital of the Buganda Kingdom, the traditional home of the 
Baganda people, Uganda’s largest ethnic group. While Kampala was administered by the British 
colonial authorities and had a population that was almost exclusively made up of European and 
Asian (primarily Indian) settlers and their descendants, Mengo remained an indigenous settlement 
that was outside of the boundaries of Kampala and governed by the Buganda Kingdom. The British 
colonial administration adopted major urban plans for Kampala in 1912, 1919, 1930 and 1951, all 
of which had the same technocratic objective of designing an orderly colonial urban environment 
that was centred on the segregation of European, Asian and African populations for racial and 
(racialized) sanitary purposes. These plans still underpin the fundamental layout of the present 
city; the major markets in Kampala, for example, are concentrated in what were formerly the 
designated European and Asian trading areas around Kampala Road, particularly to the south and 
west before the boundary with Mengo (Omolo-Okalebo et al. 2010). Kampala was finally 
expanded to incorporate Mengo, along with the other indigenous towns of Nakawa and Kawempe, 
in 1968, six years after the end of colonial rule in Uganda (Makara 2009, 235).  
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Colonial planning in Kampala had a significant impact on the evolution of informal 
economic activity in the city. The early separation of Kampala and Mengo effectively created a 
dual city in which the African population of Mengo was excluded from the colonial city centre 
and economy; this division, in many ways, continues to exist. Not only do large segments of 
Kampala’s population remain outside of the city’s formal economy, but colonial understandings 
of urban order serve as an important precursor to the later aspirations of urban management and 
development that have come to play such a crucial role in the city’s politics. The view that informal 
vending is chaotic and that it violates the city’s aesthetic and sanitary standards strongly reflects 
colonial views of well-ordered urban space. What was formerly a system of spatial and economic 
exclusion along racial lines has transformed into a system of exclusion along socioeconomic lines.4 
Informal vendors, like the indigenous residents of Mengo before them, belong to a segment of the 
population that has little or no access to formal economic life in the city, and they remain 
unwelcome in the city centre due to many of the same understandings of urban order that came to 
prominence in the colonial period.  
 
Governance and Instability  
Poor governance, instability and conflict have been defining features of Uganda’s post-
colonial history. All of these can stimulate informal economic activity by precipitating formal 
economic collapse. Such problems were particularly acute during the presidency of Idi Amin 
(1971-1979), allowing new forms of accumulation to arise (Kasfir 1983). The expulsion of the 
country’s Asian population and the seizure of their assets in 1972, the increased use of the state 
for patronage purposes and the introduction of controls all facilitated economic crisis and the rise 
of informality (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2001, 17-18). Indexed to 100 in 1960, Uganda’s per 
capita GDP fell from 106 in 1971 to 66 in 1979, while domestic investments decreased from 15% 
to 6% of GDP, exports declined from 19% to 3% of GDP, inflation increased from 4% to 216% 
and external debt grew from 172.4 million USD to 590.2 million USD (ibid, 18). Conflict and 
instability continued after Amin was overthrown, with the country’s next two leaders, Yusuf Lule 
and Godfrey Binaisa, removed from office in a period of 13 months, Milton Obote returning to the 
presidency following a disputed election and, most significantly, the civil war that ultimately 
brought the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and Yoweri Museveni to power. By the end 
 
4 For a critique of the importance of colonial heritage in the politics of vending, see Morange (2015).  
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of the war in 1986, Uganda’s economy was still in far worse shape than it had been in 1971: 
indexed GDP had fallen to 60, domestic investments were at 8%, exports were at 9%, inflation 
was at 96% and external debt was at 1.422 billion USD (ibid, 20). 
The sustained period of economic crisis that the country experienced under Amin led to a 
proliferation of black market activities, known in Uganda as magendo. Scarcities produced by the 
widespread collapse of the formal economy, fuelled by unrealistically low state-imposed price 
controls and an overvalued official exchange rate, resulted in new forms of distribution 
surrounding the sale of high-demand goods and services at significantly inflated profit margins. 
Magendo proved to be highly lucrative for many involved in it, and evolved to the point where it 
developed its own internal class structure that was characterized by an elite group of between five 
and five hundred wealthy mafuta mingi, about 2,500 mid-level magendoists and, at the bottom, a 
group of bayaye, which made up 7% of the country’s population and was comprised of labourers, 
drivers, enforcers and, importantly, street vendors. The extent and cohesiveness of these 
hierarchies is uncertain, but they changed dramatically when the political conditions that produced 
magendo largely disappeared with the fall of the Amin regime and a period of further political and 
economic upheaval ensued (Kasfir 1983).  
The NRM’s victory did not end conflict in Uganda. It instead made it more regionalized. 
Tripp (2010, 149-179) identifies twelve major armed groups that have engaged in conflict with the 
government since 1986, including one in the Central region, two in the Western region, two in the 
Eastern region (where cattle raiding has also been a considerable problem) and seven in the 
Northern region, the most notable of which is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The state has 
played a significant role in perpetuating conflict with the LRA by severely neglecting the region 
and carrying out major abuses on its population, pursuing contradictory resolutions to the conflict 
and even allowing the war to continue for economic or political reasons. This reflects a broader 
marginalization of Northern Uganda by the NRM, which has its roots in the southern, and 
particularly western, part of the country.5 Such conflict can prevent formal sector development and 
cause significant population displacement, contributing to the growth of informality.  
 
 
5 Also see Carbone (2008, 63-76). 
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Economic Liberalization 
Uganda has adopted extensive reforms to liberalize its economy. Initiated in two stages, 
first by Milton Obote in 1981 and subsequently by the NRM in 1987, in co-operation with the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these entailed the introduction of a 
standard set of market-oriented policies that were aimed at promoting growth, stabilization and a 
sustainable balance of payments (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2001, 19-23). Due to the 
country’s subsequent performance, these reforms have been viewed as a major success. Annual 
growth averaged around 7% in the 1990s and 2000s (The World Bank 2015b, 6), exceeding the 
Sub-Saharan African average in both decades (2%6 and 5.7%,7 respectively). Inflation decreased, 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) grew and services and industry have increased 
significantly, at the expense of agriculture, as a percentage of GDP (The World Bank 2018c). 
Livelihoods in the country have also undergone a major transformation, with the number of 
Ugandans living in poverty falling from 55.7% in 1992/93 (Okidi et al. 2005, 6) to 19.7% in 
2012/13 before rising slightly to 21.4% in 2016/17 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics 2018, 90).  
This performance, however, has important caveats. Early growth, while high, was 
significantly aided by the end of conflict, higher coffee prices and international aid, and nominal 
GDP per capita only returned to its 1971 level in 1996 (The World Bank 2007, 4), while in real 
terms, it still lagged its 1960 level in 1999 (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2001, 16 and 22). The 
impact of reforms is therefore difficult to measure. Growth has also been uneven; poverty would 
have declined by a further 20% between 1992/93 and 2009/10 if inequality levels had remained 
constant (The World Bank 2012, 9). Urban inequality has risen, from a Gini coefficient of 0.363 
in 2005/06 to 0.410 in 2012/13, even while rural inequality has dropped (ibid, 33). Early 
performance levels have also proven difficult to sustain, with growth slowing from 2012, and 
inflation remains erratic (The World Bank 2018c). The country’s privatization process itself was 
defined by pervasive cronyism and corruption (Tangri and Mwenda 2001), while the support 
provided by foreign donors for liberalization reforms has fuelled patronage by providing the 
government with extensive resources that can be distributed with little accountability (Mwenda 
and Tangri 2005).  
 
6 The World Bank (2015b, 6). 
7 The World Bank (2015a, 106). 
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What is particularly relevant here is how economic liberalization has impacted informality. 
While a lack of economic data on the historical evolution of Uganda’s informal sphere makes it 
difficult to empirically assess the effect of liberalization, three primary mechanisms that define 
this causal relationship more generally can be identified. The first of these is privatization and the 
reduction of public employment. Throughout the 1990s, 62 of the country’s 156 public enterprises 
were subjected to some form of privatization and a further 31 were liquidated,8 while the number 
of civil servants employed by the state fell by about 50%, from 320,000 to 160,000, between 1992 
and 1999.9 Efforts to reduce state spending and introduce market pressures can have an immediate 
negative impact on formal employment by causing large numbers of people employed in the public 
sector and/or by parastatals to lose their jobs. Without an equivalent increase in formal 
employment in the private sector, many of these people will be forced into the informal sphere to 
secure their livelihoods. Second, free trade can increase imports that harm domestic producers, 
and demand for exports (where it exists) may fail to produce employment if it is met through 
productivity growth (Lee and Vivarelli 2006). Such an occurrence is contrary to key components 
of neoclassical trade theory—notably the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which states that developing 
countries will take advantage of their abundant supply of cheap labour to export labour-intensive 
goods while importing capital-intensive goods, and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which states 
that a rise in prices for labour goods will result in increased labour demand, raising wages—but is 
nevertheless empirically observable (Verick 2006; and Lee and Vivarelli 2006). The fewer sectors 
in which a country has a comparative advantage, the larger the rise in informality resulting from 
liberalization will be (Ghosh and Paul 2008). Finally, FDI can also harm formal employment by 
driving out domestic firms, by introducing new technologies and through mergers and acquisitions 
(Lee and Vivarelli 2006).  
Proponents of liberalization maintain that the labour market effects of reforms represent 
short-term shocks rather than long-term consequences.10 Liberalization, however, has certainly not 
yet led to adequate formal job creation in Uganda. Growth in output in non-agricultural sectors has 
not been matched by a proportional growth in demand for labour, with over 70% of Ugandans still 
 
8 Collier and Reinikka (2001, 37). Total number of public enterprises taken from Carbone (2008), 53. For this process, 
see Tangri and Mwenda (2001). 
9 Collier and Reinikka (2001), 27. Carbone (2008, 54) claims this decline took place in “less than five years”.  
10 For the argument that liberalization can have negative short-term effects followed by positive long-term effects on 
the labour market, see Bacchetta et al. (2009).  
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engaged in agriculture in 2013 despite its diminishing share of GDP (The World Bank 2013, 22-
24). The sectors of the economy that have experienced the most growth are not labour intensive, 
while sectors that do require more labour have seen little productivity growth. This means that an 
asymmetry exists between economic growth and new employment, with high growth sectors not 
adequately contributing to formal employment and high employment sectors not adequately 
contributing to growth. Employment patterns have also changed across firms. Total employment 
actually declined in firms with more than five employees outside of trade, manufacturing and 
hotels and restaurants during the 1990s (The World Bank 2007, 36-40), and the average number 
of employees at larger firms fell in the 2000s (The World Bank 2013, 36). Across all sectors and 
firms, the total number of jobs that have been created falls significantly short of the needs of the 
country’s labour market. According to a 2013 World Bank report, Uganda has the fastest growing 
labour force in the world, outpacing job creation to the point that only about 20% of young labour 
market entrants are able to secure wage employment (ibid, 28 and 35).  
The informal sphere acts as a cushion to absorb this excess labour capacity, making it a 
key feature of Uganda’s structural transformation. Indeed, as a study by the World Bank points 
out, with high productivity growth and insufficient employment opportunities, the informal sphere 
allows the country’s transition to be more broad-based, contributing to faster growth, less 
inequality and lower poverty (Fox and Pimhidzai 2011). Without it, a significantly larger share of 
the country’s population would be stuck in low-productivity agriculture, waiting to be absorbed 
into the formal labour market to participate in the country’s narrow growth. Following structuralist 
accounts, the informal sphere also buttresses the formal economy by providing it with low-cost 
inputs and cheap labour, providing goods and services to formal workers with low wages and 
acting as a source of demand for formal sector goods. Economic liberalization therefore not only 
helps produce informality, but is dependent upon it for its success.  
 
The Geography of Development 
Development varies significantly across Uganda, with notable differences both between 
and within regions. In 2016/17, 12.7% of the population in the Central region lived in poverty, 
compared to 11.4% in the Western region, 32.5% in the Northern region and 35.7% in the Eastern 
region (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2018, 90). While the number of people living in poverty in 
the Central region fell by more than half between 1992/93 and 2009/10, it rose by about 300,000 
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in the Northern region over the same period (The World Bank 2012, 3). Within regions, the main 
differences exist between rural and urban areas. In 2016/17, the urban poverty rate stood at just 
9.6%, and only 2.6% in Kampala (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2018, 90). Access to basic services 
in Kampala exceeds both rural areas and other urban centres (The World Bank 2015b, 47). 
Employment opportunities are also concentrated in urban areas, which experienced 65% of 
Uganda’s job creation between 2001 and 2010, and in Kampala and the surrounding area in 
particular (ibid, 29). Wages for these jobs are in excess of those in rural areas. In total, urban areas 
account for 70% of non-agricultural GDP (ibid, 41).  
These differences make urban centres attractive alternatives to the countryside, fuelling 
urban growth. Although Uganda remains a largely rural country, with only 23.8% of its population 
living in cities, it is experiencing the fastest rate of urbanization in the world at an estimated 5.7% 
per year between 2015 and 2020 (United Nations 2018). Kampala is by far Uganda’s largest urban 
agglomeration, containing 6.4% of the country’s population  and 29.1% of its urban inhabitants 
(ibid).11 Kampala’s population has increased from just 755,000 in 1990 to 2,986,000 in 2015 (ibid), 
and the city experienced an average annual growth rate of 4.91% per year between 2010 and 
2015.12 These growth trends are likely to continue on their upward trajectory, with the UN 
estimating that Kampala, with an average annual growth rate of 5.11%, will be the second fastest 
growing urban agglomeration in the world between 2025 and 2030 behind Bujumbura, Burundi 
(5.3%), and the fourth fastest growing urban agglomeration between 2030 and 2035 behind 
Bujumbura (5.02%) and Zinder (5.38%) and Niamey (5.37%), Niger (ibid).  
This urban growth contributes to the prevalence of informal economic activity. This is 
primarily because it is not accompanied by adequate formal job creation. In fact, the portion of the 
country’s jobs located in urban areas fell from 75% in 2001 to 70% in 2010 (The World Bank 
2015b, 42). In 2015, 85.8% of the working population in Kampala were in informal employment; 
for all urban areas in Uganda, the figure was 86.2% (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2017, 169). The 
state is heavily implicated in this process of urban growth and informality. Primarily, as discussed 
above, it has failed to prioritize formal job creation, forcing the informal sphere to absorb the 
impact of the transition from agricultural to non-agricultural work. It has also facilitated this 
 
11 The UN elsewhere puts the former at 4.8% and the latter at 29.9% (2015, 467 and 433), while the World Bank 
claims the latter is 35% (2015b, 33).  
12 Figures for the Kampala urban agglomeration.  
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process by failing to address, or, through its development plans, exacerbating, rural/urban 
differences. As a Member of Parliament from Kampala pointed out, the government has allowed 
Kampala to become the country’s unrivalled economic and political centre where jobs and services 
are concentrated, but uses its coercive power against the informal street vendors who come to the 
city in search of better livelihoods.13 Such efforts have caused many vendors to leave Kampala 
and relocate either to the city’s periphery or back to the countryside. They have not yet, however, 
succeeded in eradicating street vending.  
 
Taxation 
The government of Uganda is currently undertaking a concerted effort to formalize the 
country’s informal sphere by bringing it within the national tax structure. The primary rationale 
for such efforts is to enhance revenue collection by broadening the tax base, but proponents of 
similar plans elsewhere also claim that taxing the informal sphere can have the more general 
benefits of promoting economic growth and good governance (Joshi et al 2012; and Tax Justice 
Network 2012). Uganda’s need to boost domestic revenue collection is clear: at 13.8% in 2016/17, 
the share of its GDP that the government takes in as revenue is extremely low, falling considerably 
short of both the regional average and total expenditures (The World Bank 2018b, 21). Despite its 
current if inconsistent upward trend (ibid, 21-22), this figure has increased only marginally since 
rising from just 7% in 1991 to around 12% in 1997 (Fjeldstad 2005, 2). Efforts to tax the formal 
sphere were intensified with the introduction of Uganda’s 2015/16 National Budget, which, 
amongst other changes, made Tax Identification Numbers (TINs) mandatory and increased the 
threshold for presumptive tax from 50 million Ugandan shillings (UGX)14 to 150 million UGX. 
The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) expected the changes introduced with the budget to raise 
revenue mobilization to 14% of GDP, a figure that is still comparatively low.15 By June 2015, one 
month before these measures came into effect, 21,047 people, including 20,368 in Kampala, had 
already been registered through the Taxpayer Registration Expansion Program (TREP), bringing 
in 800 million UGX (Ladu 2015a), while the URA had identified 100,000 informal businesses to 
target for tax payments (Nantaba 2015). 
 
13 Interview, Member of Parliament, Parliament of Uganda, 27 July 2015. 
14 The value of the Ugandan shilling fluctuated between approximately 3619 and 3884 UGX to USD throughout 2018.  
15 Figure taken from Ladu (2015a). Also see; Akol (2015); Busuulwa (2015); Uganda National Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (2015); and Tentena (2015). 
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Of course, neoliberal analyses of informal economic activity point to taxation as a major 
source of informality. The logic of this argument rests on the comparative costs and benefits of 
formality and informality: as taxation raises the costs of formality, it offsets the benefits of 
formalization, changing the calculus that enterprises face. There is evidence that dissatisfaction 
with what is seen as excessive taxation is widespread. A spokesperson for the Kampala City 
Traders Association (KACITA) criticized the number of taxes formal businesses are subject to, 
including corporate income tax (30%), value-added tax (18%), withholding taxes (6%) and import 
duties (25%).16 One small shop owner complained of having to pay 200,000 UGX in taxes on a 
400,000 UGX income, with a further 150,000 UGX going to rent.17 Another was similarly unhappy 
about having to pay 2 million UGX in combined taxes and rent on an income of 2.5 million UGX.18 
A third complained that taxes, combined with various fees and transportation costs, can raise the 
cost of importing a container of goods in excess of the value of the goods themselves.19 Operating 
in the informal sphere does not mean that one is free from the effects of these taxes. Informal 
vendors may pay some taxes themselves, which can force them to raise their prices, diminishing 
their competitiveness and making their goods unaffordable to many of their customers, particularly 
those who also engage in informal activities.20 Even a vendor who does not personally pay taxes 
can still be affected by higher prices when a supplier is taxed.21 
Concerns about taxes are tied to broader complaints about the costs that Uganda’s current 
regulatory structure imposes on formal businesses. The World Bank’s Doing Business project 
ranks Uganda’s regulatory environment at 127th in the world according to a set of criteria derived 
from the principles of economic liberalism, noting that it takes 24 days and 33.6% of per capita 
income to start a business and that such tasks as acquiring construction permits, getting electricity 
and property registration can be both lengthy and costly.22 The country’s Business Licensing 
Reform Committee “conservatively” estimates the annual costs of adhering to all requirements for 
a business license to be 725.73 billion UGX, equal to 3.49% of GDP (Business Licensing Reform 
Committee 2012). Concerns about these costs were expressed in interviews with both KACITA23 
 
16 Interview, KACITA representative, 11 July 2015. 
17 Interview I, shop vendor, 17 August 2015.  
18 Interview II, shop vendor, 17 August 2015.  
19 Group interview, shop vendors, 8 July 2015.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Interview I, Owino Market vendor, 9 July 2015.  
22 The World Bank (2018a). Figures for starting a business taken from page 6. 
23 Interview, KACITA representative, 11 July 2015.  
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and the Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU).24 It is possible that such costs serve as a 
disincentive for formalization.  
The relationship between taxation and informality, however, is not as simple as the 
neoliberal argument suggests. Uganda’s taxation system likely contributes to the prevalence of 
informal economic activity in the country, but the reason it does so is not simply because rates are 
too high. Three other factors are commonly ignored: that poor service provision by the Ugandan 
government means that there are few incentives to pay; similarly, that widespread corruption 
means that many believe money paid in taxes will not be spent for the public good; and that rates 
are not necessarily too high, suggesting that all business taxes need to be reduced, but that they are 
too regressive, with the government neglecting to implement more progressive alternatives that 
would target different sources of revenue.  
A significant dissatisfaction with the poor quality or lack of services provided by the 
government was expressed by a number of interview respondents. This was explicitly linked to 
views on taxation, and the argument that people would be much more willing to pay their taxes if 
they felt their money would be spent on services that had an identifiable personal or social benefit. 
As one respondent claimed, “[p]eople would be much happier to pay if they saw where their money 
was going”, stating: “I would be much happier to pay tax if I went to public schools and they had 
facilities, if I went to hospitals and they had medicine.... Why should I give you my money for 
garbage collection when I’m going to have to pay someone to collect my garbage? If you want me 
to pay you, then get somebody to collect my garbage.”25 This is particularly pronounced for 
informal actors who receive little from the government either as economic agents or members of 
the urban poor. As one street vendor put it, the government “milk[s] the cow without giving it 
grass”, demanding taxes from informal vendors while providing them with little or no support.26 
The URA’s internal research recognizes that popular perceptions of the government have a major 
impact on tax compliance, with views of service provision the most important factor in this regard. 
The problem from the perspective of the URA, however, is that it is specifically tasked with the 
collection of revenue, and detached from the broader political processes that form policy and 
 
24 Interview, PSFU representative, 20 July 2015.  
25 Interview, KACITA representative, 11 July 2015.  
26 Group interview, street vendors, 8 July 2015. 
  15 
 
influence compliance.27 If paying taxes involves a calculation of costs and benefits, the 
government is not providing adequate inducements for formalization.  
Paired with the widespread dissatisfaction with service provision is the popular perception 
that money paid to the state in taxes will merely be stolen by corrupt officials (Nkonge 2013). A 
spokesperson for KACITA questioned why a person should have to pay their taxes “to send the 
money to government for personal use rather than public good”.28 Corruption is a significant 
problem in Uganda, with the country ranked 151st of 180 in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (2018). Corruption is pervasive throughout major government 
institutions, including the URA, where a 2005 study found declining real wages , few 
consequences for poor performance and widespread political interference and patronage (Fjeldstad 
2005). The fact that officials may accept or demand bribes in exchange for tax relief further 
undermines revenue collection. One study finds that, for a firm, on average, a one percent increase 
in bribe payments per employee results in a seven percent reduction in taxes per employee 
(Gauthier and Goyette 2014).  
There are also significant problems surrounding the progressivity of Uganda’s tax system. 
Even though the country’s corporate tax rate is set at 30%, and presumptive taxes are 
approximately 1.5% to 3% (and 0% under 150 million UGX) (Uganda National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 2015), a 2012 World Bank report noted that non-agricultural household 
enterprises, many of which are informal, have an effective tax rate of 52% due to the costs of 
various fee payments. This means that taxes on businesses are, in effect, regressive, and consume 
a larger share of income for smaller enterprises than larger firms. While the Ugandan government 
seeks to expand the country’s tax system within the informal sphere, it ignores other major sources 
of revenue. Uganda is one of the few countries in the world where owner-occupied residential 
properties are not taxed (The World Bank 2015b, 57), despite the fact that property taxes have 
minimal impact on economic activity and are generally proportionate to a taxpayer’s wealth. 
Foreign investors also receive generous exemptions. One 2012 study lists three different tax 
incentives offered to all investors, four to exporting companies, two special corporate and 
withholding tax exemptions, seven incentives for businesses operating in designated free trade 
areas and a variety of sector-specific incentives (Tax Justice Network – Africa and ActionAid 
 
27 Group interview, URA, 11 August 2015.  
28 Interview, KACITA representative, 11 July 2015.  
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International 2012). The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimated the total revenue lost to 
these incentives in 2009/10 to be at least 690 billion UGX, equivalent to two percent of GDP (ibid, 
1). This figure rose to about 1.5 trillion UGX in 2013/14, a year when total revenues were 
approximately 8 trillion UGX (Ladu 2015b). As a result, more of the tax burden is falling on 
(generally) poorer informal actors than wealthier international investors. Such exemptions are not 
only damaging to revenue collection, but also make little economic sense. One survey found that 
over 92% of investors benefiting from tax incentives in Uganda would have made the same 
investments even if no incentives were on offer (Awasthi 2012). Indeed, many of the foreign 
donors that Uganda depends upon for a significant portion of its national budget have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the impact of the country’s tax incentives on domestic revenue mobilization 
(Mbanga 2003; and Mweisgwa 2012).  
Uganda’s tax system therefore contributes to the prevalence of informality in the country. 
It does so, however, not because rates are too high, but because revenues are disconnected from 
service provision, corruption undermines compliance and the entire regime is regressive and 
poorly designed for revenue maximization. Failures in the country’s tax system therefore reflect 
broader failures in governance. The informal economy is currently being targeted while these 
remain unaddressed.  
 
The Self-Interest of State Officials 
State corruption, as discussed above, can promote informality by reducing tax compliance. 
More generally, it can also reduce economic growth (Gyimah-Brempong 2002; and Mo 2001), and 
while growth has not led to adequate formal employment creation in Uganda, lower growth due to 
corruption is not conducive to formal sector expansion. At a lower level, corruption amongst state 
officials who are charged with carrying out efforts to reduce informality can result in poor 
enforcement. This, again, can be true for tax administrators, or for those charged with 
implementing Kampala’s ban on street vending. Indeed, the problem that street vendors in 
particular face is not merely that the state is excessively regulatory, but that it is also predatory, 
with state agents taking advantage of vendors’ vulnerability.29  
Besides merely being corrupt, state officials may also have direct economic interests in 
particular informal sectors. Kampala’s ubiquitous matatus are commonly owned by politicians, 
 
29 A similar point in made in Anjaria (2006).  
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particularly in the NRM, who are able to undermine attempts to regulate the industry, and have 
experienced a level of success in resisting the attention of the state that stands in notable contrast 
to, as one Member of Parliament highlighted, the experiences of street vendors.30 Less widely 
known is the fact that many state officials allegedly own structures, often several, in major markets 
throughout Kampala, something that is likely facilitated by plans to sell market space to investors 
to finance redevelopment projects. These economic interests offer little incentive to alter the status 
quo surrounding informality, or, in the case of markets, provide a strong incentive to support 
development plans that will lead to personal financial gain.  
The interest that state officials have in the informal sphere is not merely financial. 
Politicians can rely on informal actors for electoral support, and in exchange for providing this 
support, informal actors are able to enjoy a certain degree of political protection.31 Thus, the desire 
for expanding or reinforcing political power can clash with other regulatory objectives surrounding 
urban management and development, allowing informality to thrive despite official formalization 
or regulation efforts. Such a system of exchange, however, is dependent on particular political 
circumstances; when these circumstances change, it can similarly be in the interests of state 
officials to repress informal actors or seek to impose forms of urban management and development 
that are exclusionary. This is precisely what happened in Kampala as the recent de-democratization 
of local politics resulted in the repression of street vending (Young 2018 and 2017).  
 
Conclusions 
Informal vending in Uganda is inseparably tied to the state. Through past colonial planning, 
a history of poor governance and instability, economic liberalization, geographic development 
trends, its taxation regime and the self-interest of state officials, the state has played a major role 
in the emergence and growth of the country’s informal sphere. In the absence of adequate formal 
employment opportunities and formalization incentives, the informal sphere has become a key 
livelihood source for a significant portion of the country’s population, underlying the supposed 
success of Uganda’s economic transformation. Despite the crucial developmental role that it plays, 
however, the informal sphere is nevertheless targeted by the state for failing to adhere to a 
 
30 Interview, Member of Parliament, Parliament of Uganda, 27 July 2015. The ownership of matatus is also discussed 
in Goodfellow (2010, 17-18).  
31 This phenomenon has been observed elsewhere, perhaps most notably in Latin America. See, for example: Cross 
(1998); and Holland (2016 and 2017). 
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particular notion of development, meaning that the state both creates conditions in which informal 
economic activity becomes a crucial form of livelihood support while also (inconsistently) 
punishing those who engage in it (Young 2018 and 2017).  
Recognizing the centrality of the state in the origin and evolution of informality has 
important implications for informal economic governance. Primarily, it further underlines the 
importance of designing effective institutions, development policies and interventions that can 
promote inclusive governance. If the existence of informal economic activity is largely the result 
of the failures of the state, then addressing these failures is of paramount importance for 
governments that wish to promote formalization. Addressing the urban divisions creating by 
colonial planning, minimizing predatory governance and conflict, easing the dislocations caused 
by economic liberalization, reducing geographic inequalities in development, designing an 
inclusive tax system and reformulating incentive structures that encourage state officials to pursue 
private over public goods are all crucial for effective informal economic governance. There are, of 
course, major barriers to each of these objectives; indeed, they are what make informality so 
intractable and lead to the widespread failure of informal economic governance. If states truly wish 
to implement effective informal sector governance, however, then their own role in causing and 
perpetuating informality can no longer be ignored.  
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